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Meteoroid and Orbital Debris Threats to NASA’s Docking Seals: 
Initial Assessment and Methodology 
Henry C. de Groh III, Christopher A. Gallo, and Henry K. Nahra 
National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
Glenn Research Center 
Cleveland, Ohio 44135 
Abstract 
The Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) will be exposed to the Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD) 
environment in Low Earth Orbit (LEO) during missions to the International Space Station (ISS) and to the 
micrometeoroid environment during lunar missions. The CEV will be equipped with a docking system which 
enables it to connect to ISS and the lunar module known as Altair; this docking system includes a hatch that opens 
so crew and supplies can pass between the spacecrafts. This docking system is known as the Low Impact Docking 
System (LIDS) and uses a silicone rubber seal to seal in cabin air. The rubber seal on LIDS presses against a metal 
flange on ISS (or Altair).  All of these mating surfaces are exposed to the space environment prior to docking. The 
effects of atomic oxygen, ultraviolet and ionizing radiation, and MMOD have been estimated using ground based 
facilities. This work presents an initial methodology to predict meteoroid and orbital debris threats to candidate 
docking seals being considered for LIDS. The methodology integrates the results of ground based hypervelocity 
impacts on silicone rubber seals and aluminum sheets, risk assessments of the MMOD environment for a variety of 
mission scenarios, and candidate failure criteria. The experimental effort that addressed the effects of projectile 
incidence angle, speed, mass, and density, relations between projectile size and resulting crater size, and relations 
between crater size and the leak rate of candidate seals has culminated in a definition of the seal/flange failure 
criteria. The risk assessment performed with the BUMPER code used the failure criteria to determine the probability 
of failure of the seal/flange system and compared the risk to the allotted risk dictated by NASA’s program 
requirements.   
Nomenclature 
A spacecraft surface area exposed to MMOD threats, m2 
c-c distance between the center of the crater and the center-line of the seal, mm 
Dseal average diameter of the crater in the elastomer, = (dv +ds + dc)/3, mm 
Df average diameter of the crater in the flange material, in this case, aluminum alloy, = (dfi + dfo)/2, mm 
dfi average inner diameter of the crater, in plane with the surface of the metal target, mm 
dfo average outer diameter of the crater, the outer diameter of the metal crater’s crown, mm 
dv average maximum diameter vaporized in the crater in the elastomer, mm 
ds average diameter of secondary crater damage in the elastomer, mm 
dc average diameter of radial cracks in the elastomer, mm 
Dcrit the minimum crater diameter that causes seal or flange failure, the “critical” crater diameter, mm 
h crown height of the crater, mm 
KE kinetic energy, joules, J 
m projectile mass  
P(Sio) The intersection of failure probabilities for the inner and outer seals 
P(SiFo) The intersection of failure probabilities for the inner seal and outer flange area  
P(SoFi) The intersection of failure probabilities for the outer seal and inner flange area 
P(Fio) The intersection of failure probabilities for the inner and outer flange areas  
ρp projectile density, g/cm3 
ρt target density, g/cm3 
t time exposed to MMOD threats, years 
V projectile impact velocity, km/s 
wbulb width of the elastomer seal bulb, mm 
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W width of the whole seal area being considered, mm 
WF seal or flange width upon which a particular particle must hit to cause a failure; example for flange:  
 WF|f = Df – Dcrit|f, mm 
s as a subscript refers to the elastomer seal 
f as a subscript refers to the metal flange 
F as a subscript refers to seal/flange failure 
Acronyms 
APAS Androgynous Peripheral Attachment System 
ATLAS APAS To Low impact docking system Adaptor System 
BLE Ballistic Limit Equation 
C-P Cour-Palais 
CEV Crew Exploration Vehicle 
HVI Hypervelocity Impact 
ISS International Space Station 
LIDS Low Impact Docking System 
LOC Loss of Crew 
LOM Loss of Mission 
LOMo Loss of Mission objective 
MEM Meteoroid Engineering Model 
MMOD Micrometeoroid and Orbital Debris 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
ORDEM Orbital Debris Engineering Model 
PNF Probability of No Failure 
PNP Probability of No Penetration 
POF Probability of Failure 
SRD Systems Requirements Document 
WSTF White Sands Test Facility 
I. Introduction 
While in space, NASA’s Crew Exploration Vehicle (CEV) and the International Space Station (ISS) will be 
exposed to very high velocity impacts from space debris and meteoroids.1-6 These threats are commonly referred to 
as Micrometeoroid Orbital Debris (MMOD). The CEV will have a docking system which enables it to connect to 
ISS and other spacecraft and a hatch that opens so crew and supplies can pass between them. This docking system is 
known as the Low Impact Docking System (LIDS) and uses a silicone rubber seal to seal in cabin air. 7 Figure 1 
shows schematics of ISS, CEV, LIDS, and the LIDS main seal- which is a set of two concentric seals. The rubber 
seals on LIDS press against an aluminum flange on ISS.  Prior to docking, both of these mating surfaces are exposed 
to the space environment. The level of environmental exposure received by an object like the seals depends 
primarily on the object’s altitude and orientation relative to its orbital velocity vector, the Earth, and the Sun. The 
main aspects of the space environment that cause damage to spacecraft are atomic oxygen, ultraviolet and ionizing 
radiations, and MMOD.8 The effects of atomic oxygen, ultraviolet and ionizing radiations on the LIDS seals have 
been presented elsewhere.9  
 The objective of this work is to determine the risk of LIDS seal failure due to MMOD threats and compare these 
expected risks to allowable risk specifications for various missions.  Such an assessment involves hypervelocity 
impact (HVI) testing that leads to a well defined failure criteria which in turn, in conjunction with a risk analysis, 
enables expected risk levels to be compared to risk levels allowed for NASA missions.  This paper presents our 
results of ground based hypervelocity impacts on silicone rubber seals and aluminum sheet plates along with an 
assessment of the MMOD environment posed risk relevant to a variety of CEV mission scenarios.  The 
methodology developed also is used to evaluate different candidate seal designs and corresponding risk levels to 
help guide future design decisions. 
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a)                 b)  
Figure 1. ISS, CEV, LIDS and the LIDS seal. a) Artist’s drawing of CEV docking to ISS; b) Schematic of 
LIDS and its primary seal which are located at the nose of CEV. 
 
Although silicone based seals have been used extensively by NASA,10 we have not found applicable 
hypervelocity impact studies for elastomers prior to the work presented here. Related work has typically 
concentrated on modeling the MMOD environment,11-14 or on metal, glass, or composite targets, or on the depth of 
penetration of the hypervelocity projectile, rather than the diameter of the crater and characteristics of the crater’s 
crown (the area around the crater that is raised above the surface of the substrate).11,15-17 Many estimates of crater 
size or depth begin with Cour-Palais type relations.11,12,15 which are applicable to the threshold penetration of single, 
thin, ductile metal plates. Cour-Palais relations in connection with penetration are not directly applicable to our case 
since we are considering elastomers instead of ductile metals, relatively thick targets, and have a failure mode that is 
dominated by the surface diameter of the crater and crown morphology, not by projectile penetration depth. Our 
seals generally fail one of three ways. The first failure mode is when the projectile makes a crater in the elastomer 
that spans the width of the seal. The second is when the diameter of the crater in the metal surface, upon which the 
seal is to mate, spans the width of the seal. The third failure mode is when the crown of the crater is very tall or has 
“rolled over” making a tube, or protected area, that the seal cannot seal over. The depth of projectile penetration 
found through Cour-Palais type data and analysis is not equal to the crater’s diameter in-plane with the target’s 
surface. However, prior work has shown that for projectiles and targets of the same material, at sufficiently high 
velocities, the in-plane diameter of a crater is close to two times the depth of the crater.18,19 Cour-Palais estimates 
(with the adoption of this semi-spherical convention) and other scaling laws,20 will be compared to recent 
hypervelocity tests in aluminum and silicone based elastomers. 
Elastomer seals made of two silicone based elastomer compounds were impacted with hypervelocity particles. 
The compounds tested were Parker S0383-70 which has a durometer Shore A hardness of 70, and Esterline ELS-
SA-401 which has a Shore A hardness of about 40. Due to limits on the clamping force applied when LIDS docks, 
the baseline seal made from the Parker compound is narrow compared to the softer Esterline seal, which is 9.1 mm 
wide. The leak rate of these seals was tested before and after impacts.  
The LIDS seal mates to an aluminum alloy flange. To examine how the seals will perform with a flange that 
might be damaged from MMOD, 6 mm thick aluminum alloy plates were impacted, then an undamaged seal was 
placed over the impact crater and leak tested. In this way, the smallest particle (lowest kinetic energy) that would 
cause a seal failure was determined. With this information, the probability of impact by such a particle (or ones of 
greater kinetic energy) was determined using NASA sanctioned risk assessment codes which model the MMOD 
environment and the likelihood of impacts resulting from various mission scenario inputs.4   
NASA has established a set of design specifications for the Constellation Program.21 The design specifications 
relating to the MMOD environment are defined in Ref. 22, where it is stated that the orbital debris environment of 
LEO will be determined using the Orbital Debris Engineering Model 2000 (ORDEM2000) and the meteoroid 
environment will be determined using the Meteoroid Engineering Model (MEM). Mission parameters are input into 
these two codes which then provide detailed solutions of MMOD flux and velocity. We use these environments and 
the code known as BUMPER to estimate the risks of LIDS seal failure due to hypervelocity impacts from MMOD.  
LIDS Main Seal 
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The BUMPER computer code is a FORTRAN program that calculates the Probability of No Penetration (PNP) 
or Probability of No Impact (PNI) of a spacecraft structure.  The BUMPER code version 1.48LM-G dated 
09/26/2008 was used for this analysis.  This version has been modified by Lockheed Martin for the Crew 
Exploration Vehicle (CEV) configuration.  A finite element model of the object to be analyzed is generated by using 
either the I-DEAS or PATRAN graphics programs.  The code reads in the node and element geometry of the model 
consisting of two dimensional shell elements.  The shell elements have different protection geometries which allow 
penetration to begin at different critical particle diameters.  The critical penetrating particle diameter is defined as a 
function of the impact velocity by the Ballistic Limit Equation (BLE) function.  Then the ballistic limit function is 
selected along with the thicknesses and materials of the wall and shielding configuration.  Once all the parameters of 
the model and walls have been entered into the code, the orbital debris model ORDEM2000 and the Meteoroid 
Engineering Model (MEM) are called to define the number of penetrating particles on each of the elements 
possessing a unique BLE that is based on the protection geometry, material properties and orientation. The 
determination of the number of impacts involves integration over the particle velocity distribution and directionality 
of MMOD.  In the determination of the number of impacts, a particle diameter is usually specified and BUMPER 
predicts the number of impacts of this particle or larger.  However, the determination of the number of penetrating 
particles involves an integration of the particle diameter which for penetration is a function of the velocity as given 
by the BLE equations.  After the determination of the number of penetrating or impacting particles, the probability 
of no penetration is calculated for the selected element ranges of the model for either the orbital debris or the micro-
meteoroid environments.  Missions to ISS are in low earth orbits where significant MMOD threats from both debris 
and meteoroids exist.  However, for lunar missions the orbital debris environment is relevant primarily for the 
mission duration spent in LEO; after earth departure, the micrometeoroid environment becomes more relevant for 
risk assessments of the vehicle.  
We present in this paper under “II. Procedure” and in section A, the experiment procedures which encompass the 
target and projectile description, and the description of the HVI tests.  In section B, we introduce the methods used 
in measuring the craters’ parameters and characteristics like the diameter and crown height for the aluminum and 
elastomers.  Section C briefly discusses the leakage tests aimed at defining the damaged seal/flange leak rates and 
thereby the failure criteria.  Section D addresses the assumptions that went into the BUMPER risk assessment.  
Under “III Results”, we present in Section E the results of the crater diameter given as a function of the projectile 
kinetic energy from the experimental data for the damaged aluminum and elastomers.  The results of the MMOD 
BUMPER code assessment are presented in section F where the results are compared to NASA risk requirements.  
The paper closes with the Conclusion section. 
II. Procedure  
A. Hypervelocity Impacts 
1. Targets 
Hypervelocity impacts of elastomer and aluminum alloy targets were done at White Sands Test Facility in New 
Mexico by a team lead by Donald Henderson and Karen Rodriguez. The two peroxide cured, silicone based 
elastomer compounds were Parker’s S0383-70, and Esterline’s ELA-SA-401. Parker’s S0383-70 is rust colored with 
a Shore A hardness of 70; Esterline’s ELA-SA-401 is blond with a hardness of 40. The 6061-T651 aluminum targets 
were 178×178×6.35 mm thick (7×7×¼ in.) with a surface finish of 0.4 μm (15 μin.). Elastomer targets were tested 
in the “as received condition”, and after a treatment of atomic oxygen. Atomic oxygen treatments are used to form a 
SiOx rich surface layer to decrease the adhesive properties of the elastomers.23 Aluminum targets were tested as 
received, anodized (MIL-A-8625, Type II, Class 1), and after receiving a 0.013 mm (0.0005 in.) thick coating of 
electroless nickel (AMS-C-26074, Class 4, Grade A). It is expected that the flanges on ISS to which LIDS will mate 
will be aluminum alloy, either anodized, or perhaps coated with nickel for electrical conductivity reasons.  
Two basic LIDS seal designs are being examined, both are double seals, the Parker seal, known as a Gask-O-
Seal, is relatively narrow while the Esterline seal, known as Esterline/NASA 2-piece seal, is able to be wider since it 
is softer. A wider seal is more resistant to MMOD, however also causes clamping loads to increase; the width of the 
seal is limited by its hardness and allowable clamping loads. Figure 2 shows scaled down versions of the LIDS seals 
we are testing, and schematics of their cross sections. In hypervelocity tests, the LIDS seal designs were mimicked 
using seals of similar cross section cut from 5.5 mm thick sheet material of the same elastomer compound using a 
water-knife. We are in the process now of impacting small scale engineering seals. Figure 3 shows examples of the 
seals used in this study. In addition to these, a couple tests impacted a 3.2 mm (1/8 in.) thick aluminum plate coated 
with a 0.51 mm thick layer of the Parker S0383-70 compound simulating the web material at the base of the Gask-
O-Seal trough.  The layer of elastomer was bonded to the plate by Parker using the same methods they use in the 
production of Gask-O-Seals.  
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     a)                 b)          c) 
Figure 2. Parker Gask-O-Seal, and Esterline/NASA 2-piece seal. a) 10 cm diameter Parker seal, 30.5 cm 
diameter Parker seal, and the Esterline seal with 9.1 mm wide seal beads (blond); b) schematic of the Parker 
Gask-O-Seal cross section with the width of the inner seal area, W, shown; c) schematic of the Esterline seal.  
 
  
      a)              b)         c) 
Figure 3. Test articles used in hypervelocity impact tests. a) 5.2 and 2.5 mm wide Parker “ring” seals;  
b) 9.1 mm wide Esterline “ring” seal; c) anodized aluminum plate cratered by a 1 mm diameter, 1.4 mg, 
8 km/s aluminum projectile and a 5.1 mm wide Parker seal.  
 
2. Projectiles 
The space environment is populated with meteoroids and debris. Debris is prevalent in LEO, but decreases as 
orbital altitude increases. The average velocity of debris is between 7 and 8 km/s for particles between 0.01 and 
1 cm respectively. The average velocity of meteoroids is about 20 km/s.11,24 The density of orbital debris varies, but 
a good approximation of the average density of debris is 2.7 g/cm3, the density of aluminum.13,24 Although rocky 
and iron rich meteoroids exist, meteoroids are primarily made of ice. Thus a density of 1 g/cm3 is considered a good 
estimate of meteoroid density.22 The velocities characteristic of meteoroids exceed current ground based 
hypervelocity impact capabilities. However, velocities characteristic of debris (7.5 km/s) can be well matched by 
facilities at White Sands Test Facility (WSTF). Densities of projectiles can also be well matched in labs. Three 
different materials were used as projectiles, all were in the form of spheres: 2017 T4 grade 200 aluminum, density = 
2.79 g/cm3, hardness 105 HB; dry soda lime glass, density = 2.5 g/ cm3; and Nylon66, density = 1.14 g/ cm3. 
3. Hypervelocity Impacts 
Hypervelocity impacts were performed at the White Sands Test Facility (WSTF) Remote Hypervelocity Test 
Laboratory (RHTL) in Las Cruces, New Mexico using their .17-caliber Light Gas Gun.25 This system verifies the 
condition of the projectile and measures particle velocity using ultra-high speed digital imaging SIM cameras 
manufactured by Photo-Sonics. Projectile velocity is also measured with laser intervalometer and photodiode flash 
detectors. Maximum velocities available were about 8.3 km/s; tests at between 5 and 8.3 km/s were done. The 
velocity goal for most tests was 8.2 km/s. Most impacts were done at room temperature; a small group of impacts 
were done near -78 °C (-105 °F); a few tests are planned at the maximum LIDS seal temperature expected of 125 °C 
(257 °F). The direction, or angle, of the incoming projectile was set at 0°, 45°, or 60°, where 0° is coming straight in, 
perpendicular to the target’s surface. Impacts done at an angle were set up such that the path of the projectile was 
parallel to the seal’s major radius, coming from the seal’s center, towards its outer diameter. Most tests were done at 
0° due to the difficulty of hitting the seal, especially the narrow Parker seals, when turned at an angle.  
Table 1 presents the hypervelocity tests accomplished and used in this study to determine crater diameters and 
seal failures resulting from various projectiles. The Strike # and Specimen ID are included to assist with traceability.  
  
 
 
W 
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Table 1. Projectiles, targets and velocities used in impact tests. Targets were Parker S0383-70, Esterline ELA-SA-401, 
6061 T651 aluminum, or the aluminum coated with a 0.51 mm thick layer of the Parker elastomer. Pre-treatment notes 
exposure to atomic oxygen, or a coating on the aluminum. Mass was calculated based on density and diameter. All 
projectiles were spherical. Aluminum projectiles were 2017 T4 grade 200 ball bearings,  ρp = 2.79 g/cm3; Glass projectiles 
were 9000 Series soda lime glass size standards,  ρp =2.5 g/cm3; Nylon 66 had a density of 1.14 g/cm3; the steel projectile 
was 440 C stainless, ρp =7.7 g/cm3. Strikes 35c, 35d, and 37 were done with the target cooled to -78 °C (-108 °F). 
Strike 
# 
Target  
material 
Target AO Treatment  
atoms/cm2,  
or coating 
Target width 
or thickness, 
mm 
Angle, 
degrees off 
vertical 
Mass, 
mg 
Projectile 
diameter, 
mm 
Projectile 
Density, 
g/cc 
Velocity, 
km/s 
31 Parker As Received 2.5 wide 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 7.57 
29 Parker 8.0E+19 2.5 wide 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 5.75 
9 Parker 8.0E+19 2.5 wide 0 0.084 0.4 2.52 8.19 
35c Parker (-78 °C) 1.0E+20 2.5 wide 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 7.8 
17 Parker 1.0E+20 2.5 wide 45 0.093 0.4 2.79 7.93 
35d Parker (-78 °C) 1.2E+20 2.5 wide 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 8.22 
15 Parker 1.0E+20 2.5 wide 0 0.183 0.5 2.79 8.04 
37 Parker (-78 °C) 1.2E+20 2.5 wide 0 0.183 0.5 2.79 8.29 
6 Parker 8.0E+19 2.5 wide 0 0.316 0.6 2.79 8.22 
6b Parker 8.0E+19 2.5 wide 0 0.316 0.6 2.79 8.26 
2 Parker 7.5E+20 5.2 wide 0 0.501 0.7 2.79 8.17 
7d Parker 3.5E+20 5.2 wide 60 0.748 0.8 2.79 8.27 
7c Parker 7.5E+20 5.2 wide 60 0.748 0.8 2.79 8.29 
7f Parker 3.5E+20 5.2 wide 60 0.805 0.82 2.79 8.24 
21 Parker/Al As Received 0.5 on 3 thick 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 8.24 
22 Parker/Al As Received 0.5 on 3 thick 60 0.748 0.8 2.79 8.19 
30 Esterline As Received 9.1 wide 0 1.461 1 2.79 5.56 
32 Esterline As Received 9.1 wide 0 1.461 1 2.79 7.47 
5b Esterline As Received 9.1 wide 45 7.177 1.7 2.79 8.1 
3 Esterline 3.4E+20 9.1 wide 60 0.501 0.7 2.79 8.21 
1 Esterline 7.0E+20 9.1 wide 0 0.748 0.8 2.79 8.3 
18 Esterline 1.0E+20 9.1 wide 0 1.031 1.2 1.14 7.84 
36 Esterline 1.5E+20 9.1 wide 0 1.461 1 2.79 7.56 
10 Esterline 1.0E+20 9.1 wide 0 1.319 1 2.52 8.38 
4c Esterline 3.4E+20 9.1 wide 0 1.461 1 2.79 8.19 
16 Esterline 1.0E+20 9.1 wide 0 2.096 1.52 1.14 7.61 
38b Esterline 1.5E+20 9.1 wide 45 3.209 1.3 2.79 7.95 
8c Esterline 7.0E+20 9.1 wide 45 3.209 1.3 2.79 8.24 
14 Al As Received 6.3 thick 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 7.96 
23 Al As Received 6.3 thick 0 5.984 1.6 2.79 7.9 
13 Al Anodized 6.3 thick 0 0.183 0.5 2.79 8.14 
12 Al Anodized 6.3 thick 0 1.461 1 2.79 8.03 
19 Al Anodized 6.3 thick 0 5.762 1.58 2.79 7.9 
11 Al Anodized 6.3 thick 0 11.687 2 2.79 7.65 
40 Al Ni coated 6.3 thick 45 0.093 0.4 2.79 7.5 
39b Al Ni coated 6.3 thick 0 0.093 0.4 2.79 8.34 
50 Stainless As Received 3.0 thick 0 0.504 0.5 7.7 7.6 
 
The mass of the projectile provided was calculated based on the shape (spherical), diameter, and density of the 
particle. The diameter of the glass projectiles is accurate to within better than ± 5% based on the certified mean 
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diameters provided by the manufacturers of the spheres used.26 The densities of the projectiles were taken from the 
literature for the aluminum and Nylon66 projectiles, and from the supplier of the glass spheres. The density of the 
soda lime glass used was 2.5 ± 0.1 g/cm3. The density of the 2017 T4 aluminum alloy used was 2.79 g/cm3; 
variations in the copper content of this alloy can be expected to cause density variation of about ± 1%. We have 
assumed a similar uncertainty, ± 1%, in density for the Nylon projectiles. 
B. Crater measurements and WF 
4. Crater measurements 
 Several measurements of damaged areas in the elastomer and aluminum alloy targets were made. From these 
measurements an average crater diameter, Dseal or Df, was calculated. If the crater was elliptical, the diameter was set 
to the arithmetic average of the ellipse’s major and minor axes.  
 For the elastomers, five measurements were made:  
1) dv: The average maximum diameter of the vaporized void at the center of the crater. An example of a crater in one 
of the elastomers tested is provided in Figure 4. It can be seen in the cross sectional view made by computed 
tomography (CT) provided in Figure 4 b) that the maximum diameter of the vaporized void is, in this case, larger 
than the entry hole. dv was measured using optical photographs and close inspection of the crater and the level of 
undercutting. Figure 5 shows dv drawn on a crater in a Parker seal.  
2)  dmin: The average minimum diameter of the crater, sometimes referred to as the entry hole.  
3) ds: The average diameter of secondary damage, such as a region, or secondary crater, created by chunks of the 
surface being blown off, as show in Figure 5. If there was no significant secondary damage, or if its diameter was 
less than dv, ds was set equal to dv. For example, there is no significant secondary damage in the Esterline seal shown 
in Figure 4; in this case, ds would be set equal to dv.  
4) dc: The average diameter of the cracked region, as shown in Figures 4 and 5. 
The average diameter of the crater in the elastomer, Dseal, was defined as the average of dv, ds, and dc i.e. (Dseal = (dv 
+ ds + dc)/3).  
5) The hit location of the projectile was quantified and defined by the surface distance between the crater’s center 
and the center-line of the seal, c-c, (where the center-line of the seal is defined as the circumferential line midway 
between the seal’s inner and outer diameters). This distance between the crater’s center and seal’s center-line, c-c, is 
also used in the testing of undamaged seals over cratered metal targets. Values of c-c are negative if the crater is 
closer to the seal’s inner wall, positive if the crater is located nearer the outer wall of the seal, and c-c = 0 if the 
center of the crater is at the seal’s center-line. 
 For the metal targets, three measurements were made:  
1) dfi: The average inner diameter of the metal crater. This measurement was taken from an image of the crater by 
placing a circle (or ellipse) around the crater near its inflection point, near where the crater meets the plane of the 
target’s surface, as shown in Figure 6.  
2) dfo: The average outer diameter of the metal crater. This measurement was taken from an image of the crater by 
placing a circle (or ellipse) around the outer edges of the crater’s crown, as shown in Figure 6. 
3) h: The average height of the crown of the crater above the target’s surface. Several measurements were taken of 
the height of the crater around is circumference and averaged. Measurements were made using a side view image of 
the crater with a scale placed near the crown.  
The average crater diameter in metal targets, Df, was the average of dfi and dfo i.e. (Df = (dfi + dfo)/2). 
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5. WF, the seal/flange failure width 
In this work, one of our goals is to determine the likelihood of a seal/flange failure. The likelihood of failure for 
our seals depends on the LIDS seal, the flange to which the seal mates, and the environment. We determine the 
probability of impact by various particles using the computer code known as BUMPER, BUMPER uses two 
programs, Orbital Debris Model-ORDEM2000 and Meteoroids Engineering Model-MEM to define the orbital 
debris and micrometeoroids environments and computes impinging particle fluxes. BUMPER computes the number 
of impacts or penetrations on a particular spacecraft area from MMOD taking surface directionality into 
consideration.  A given area normally has a particular failure criteria applied to it. BUMPER considers the particle 
fluxes and failure criteria and determines the number of particles that will cause failure. The problem with applying 
this to the LIDS seal is that seal failure depends on the location of impact, thus the seal’s failure criteria is not 
constant over its width. The weighting factor WF/W is developed to proportion BUMPER results so that the 
sensitivity of the seal/flange area to impact location is accounted for.  
The critical particle is defined as the particle with the lowest kinetic energy that will cause a seal or flange 
failure. The critical particle will cause a failure if it hits the seal (or flange) on the exact center-line of the seal only 
because if a critical particle hits the seal bulb a bit off center, only one of the side-walls blows out. Tests have shown 
only a small amount of side-wall is needed to prevent seal failure. If a critical particle hits off center on the flange, 
part of the seal will miss the crater and seal on the side farther from the crater. The larger the crater is, the further 
 
Figure 5. Cratered Parker seal. Strike 17, 
Parker 2.5 mm wide seal, hit by a 0.4 mm 
diameter, 0.093 mg aluminum sphere at 
7.93 km/s, with the crater diameters dv, ds, and 
dc shown.  
                      
a)               b) 
Figure 4. Cratered Esterline seal. a) Top view of the 9.1 mm wide Esterline seal damaged by a 0.8 mm 
diameter, 0.728 mg Al sphere at 8.3 km/s, Strike 1; the black ellipses show dc - the extent of cracks 
radiating from the crater, and dv – the diameter of the vaporized material; b) Cross sectional view of the 
crater using computed tomography, seal is 5.5 mm thick, Strike 1.  
dv 
dc 
   
Figure 6. Cratered aluminum plate. Strike 19, the 
crater in an anodized 6061 T651 aluminum alloy 
plate resulting from a hit by a 1.58 mm diameter, 
5.76 mg, aluminum sphere at 7.9 km/s; the black 
circles show the inner diameter, dfi, and the outer 
diameter, dfo; a mm scale is at the top of the image. 
dfo 
 
dfi 
 
dc 
 
ds 
 
dv 
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from the center-line it can be and still cause a failure. This sensitivity of failure to crater size and hit location is 
brought into our analysis with the use of WF, the width on the seal (or flange) upon which a particular crater must 
occur to cause failure. WF is simply defined geometrically as the difference between the average crater diameter and 
the minimum average crater diameter that causes failure, as shown below with the subscripts f standing for the 
flange and s for the seal.  
 
ிܹ|௦ ൌ ܦௌ௘௔௟ െ ܦ஼௥௜௧|௦ 
ிܹ|௙ ൌ ܦ௙ െ ܦ஼௥௜௧|௙ 
 
The two concentric LIDS seals are mounted to a flange that is 38.1 mm wide around the leading edge of the 
LIDS tunnel (Figures 1 and 2). It is our job to insure MMOD threats to this area are considered. To do this we 
divided this 38.1 mm width equally between the two seals so that the area we are including in our analysis of 
MMOD threats is 19.05 mm wide for each seal. This defines W for this work, where W is the effective “width of the 
seal” being considered in the MMOD analysis. W is the width of the elastomer seal plus areas immediately adjacent 
to the seal we are responsible for, since hits in these areas might also cause seal failure (Figure 2). This definition of 
area also defines limits to WF which is thus bounded between 0 and 19.05 mm (the maximum width of the seal area 
being considered).  
MMOD threats to the whole seal area are determined using BUMPER. These threats are weighted using the ratio 
WF/W, thereby including the sensitivity of seal failure to hit location. For example, a particle that creates a crater of 
diameter Dcrit will cause a seal failure if it strikes exactly on the seal’s center-line. BUMPER is used to determine 
the likelihood of getting hit by such a critical particle anywhere in the area being considered (W wide). Normally 
getting hit by this critical particle would be considered a failure (or penetration) however the effective area at risk is 
zero because the critical particle must hit the exact center-line to cause failure, and since the center-line is infinitely 
narrow, the likelihood of hitting it is negligible (WF and thus WF/W go to 0). We multiply the probability of failure 
results that come from BUMPER for a particular kinetic energy by WF/W. This ratio is 0 when the crater’s surface 
diameter (Df or DSeal) is equal to or smaller than Dcrit, and 1 when WF is equal to or greater than W (19.05 mm in this 
case). In this way the sensitivity of seal failure to where the projectile hits in the seal area is included.  
WF and its ratio with W do not account for any effects related to damage mechanics. The damage done to the seal 
(DSeal) is also dependent on hit location, with a maximum in damage occurring near the seal’s center-line. Relations 
between the level of damage and hit location are beyond the scope of this paper, are currently being investigated, 
and will be discussed a later paper.27 At this time, for conservatism, this seal damage maximum is assumed for all 
impacts.  
C. Seal Leakage  
Elastomer seals and aluminum alloy plates damaged by hypervelocity projectiles were leak tested in a fixture 
known as the Impact Specimen Flow Fixture.28 Seals were compressed between flat plates 25% of their height and 
the space between them pressurized to 1 atm. above the pressure in the room. After pressurization input valves were 
closed and the system monitored for leakage via a pressure decay method with accurate pressure and temperature 
measurements. In the testing of cratered aluminum plates, an undamaged seal was used and the crater placed at 
various locations across the width of the seal. The details of seal leakage measurements and results are too extensive 
to be included here; these are being presented in another paper.27 Some seal leakage data is included here however 
since it is an important factor in determining seal failure, and thus MMOD threats. Seals and plates were hit with 
particles of various kinetic energies, and then leak tested. In this way Dcrit and the minimum kinetic energy required 
to cause seal failure was found for four cases: damaged Parker and Esterline seals against undamaged aluminum, 
and damaged aluminum pressed against undamaged Parker and Esterline seals. A seal/flange failure was defined as 
leakage equal to or greater than 0.001 kg air/day.  
D. Risk Assessments using BUMPER 
In the BUMPER risk assessment, the cumulative number of MMOD impacts of a particular kinetic energy or 
greater was determined. Below are the input boundary conditions used in the BUMPER risk assessments: 
• Altitude—400 km and 192,200 km 
• Orbit inclination—51.65° which is the orbital inclination of ISS. 
• Year exposure starts: 2014. 
•  Time frames:  
- 4 days at 400 km: Conservative estimate of time for CEV to pursue and dock to ISS in LEO. 
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- 8 days at 400 km: Estimate of time Altair is in LEO prior to docking with CEV. 
- 1, 2, 5, and 10 years at 400 km: Various times the ISS side of LIDS (ATLAS) might be exposed to 
LEO prior to docking with CEV. 
- 217 days at 192,200 km: Estimate of time in lunar orbit during a Lunar Outpost mission.  
 
These time frames were used to build scenarios of missions to ISS, Lunar Sortie, and Lunar Outpost. 
 
• When the vehicle is in LEO, MEMCxPv2 is used to predict the micrometeoroid flux and ORDEM2000 
to predict the orbital debris flux.  When in lunar orbit, LunarMEMv2 is used for flux calculation.   
• Area—The inner and outer seal areas were considered 2-D, defined by the following inner and outer 
areas: Inner seal area = 0.08475 m2, Outer seal area = 0.08703 m2.  
• Orientation—For conservatism, seal and flange areas were assumed to be facing into the orbital velocity 
vector.  
• Impact angle cut off – 89°. 
• Density =ρp|MM =  1g/cc where MM stands for micrometeoroid. 
• Density =ρp|OD =  2.7g/cm3 where OD stands for orbital debris. 
• Elastomer Yield Strength—Tensile Strength =  UTS = 1050 psi. 
• Speed of sound in silicone rubber = 984 m/s (3280 ft/s); in 6061 aluminum = 6400 m/s (21,000 ft/s). 
• Brinell Hardness—Elastomers typically use the Shore A durometer scale for hardness. Esterline’s ELA-
SA-401 has a Shore A (SA) hardness of 38, Parker’s S0383-70 has a SA hardness of 70; these are 
approximately equivalent to 9 and 15 BH respectively. Over aged 6061 T651 aluminum ~ 70 HB. 
• Kinetic Energy—KE inputs for the Parker seal design were between 2 and 2000 Joules; Inputs for cases 
using the Esterline design were between 200 and 16,000 J.  
 
In these simulations we used a function within BUMPER known as Option 41 when prompted for a 
penetration function, and failure criteria for a semi-infinite plate. By specifying the kinetic energy through 
Option 41, the diameter is expressed in terms of the velocity and such an expression is used as the ballistic 
limit equation (BLE) in BUMPER.  We used the RESPONSE function from the main menu to build a .rsp 
table using the ballistic limit equation in Option 41. BUMPER sweeps through various particle velocities 
and angles and determines what particle diameters will result in equal to or greater than the input kinetic 
energy. Using a result type request of “number of penetrations” the SHIELD option within BUMPER 
calculates the number of impacts at the given kinetic energy. 
III. Results 
E. Crater Size and Seal Failure 
Measurements made on damaged plates and seals are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. The maximum leakage 
allowed for the whole CEV spacecraft is about 0.01 kg air/day. The maximum leakage allocated for the LIDS seal is 
about 0.001 kg air/day. We chose this as the leakage failure criteria corresponding to a Loss of Mission objective. 
Table 2 presents results for 6061 aluminum plates, listing the Strike number, the mass, velocity, and kinetic energy 
of the particle that hit the plate, the inner (dfi), outer (dfo) and average diameter of the crater (Df), the crater’s crown 
height, h, and whether or not a seal was able to seal over the crater. Based on these results, it is concluded that an 
undamaged 2.5 mm wide Parker seal will not be able to seal over a crater in aluminum made by a particle with 
kinetic energy of 2.9 joules. The 9.1 mm wide Esterline seal fails over craters made by particles of about 180 joules 
kinetic energy. The energies at which the seals fail are important observations that enable us to determine the crater 
diameter that causes seal failure, Dcrit, and WF. Strike 23 provides an example of some of the complexities of seal 
failure. There is a peak in the crown height near 180 J (Strike 19) for impacts such as these into aluminum; at this 
kinetic energy, the crater’s crown is most full and intact and causes the leakage failure for this particular Esterline 
seal. At energies greater than 180 J the crown height declined; parts of the crown appeared to get blown off and the 
seal did not fail (Strike 23). As kinetic energy is raised further, the crater diameter increase and causes failure, as 
seen in Strike 11. In our analysis of the Esterline seal, we assume all impacts equal to or greater than 180 J cause 
seal failure. Note also that the Parker seal did not fail when placed over the crater produced in Strike 39b, even 
though it did fail over the crater of Strike 14, which was less energetic than Strike 39b. This might be due in part to 
the nickel coating on the target of Strike 39b; the target in Strike 14 was as received thus was not nickel coated or 
anodized.   
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Table 2. Surface Diameters of Craters in Flange Materials. Leakage column indicates seal pass or failure for the 2.5 mm 
wide Parker seal (P), or the 9.1 mm wide Esterline (E) seal. All targets were 6061 T651 aluminum except for Strike 50, 
which was stainless steel. Seal failure is defined as leakage > 0.001 kg air/day. See Table 1 for additional Strike details 
such as projectile density, and incoming angle. 
Strike # Mass, mg Velocity, km/s 
Kinetic Energy, 
Joules 
Crater ID, 
dfi, mm 
Crater OD, 
dfo, mm 
Ave. Crater 
dia., Df, mm 
Crown Height, 
h, mm Leakage 
40 0.093 7.5 2.63 1.46 1.73 1.59 0.255 P-Pass 
14 0.093 7.96 2.96 1.78 2.47 2.13 0.351 P-Fail 
39b 0.093 8.34 3.25 1.75 2.20 1.98 0.344 P-Pass 
13 0.183 8.14 6.05 2.20 2.82 2.51 0.42 P-Fail 
12 1.461 8.03 47.10 4.70 6.10 5.40 0.98 E-Pass 
19 5.762 7.9 179.80 7.02 9.57 8.30 1.50 E-Fail 
23 5.984 7.9 186.72 7.09 9.29 8.19 1.27 E-Pass 
11 11.687 7.65 341.97 9.30 10.80 10.05 1.00 E-Fail 
50 0.504 7.6 14.55 1.96 2.67 2.32 
 
Table 3. Surface Diameters for Craters in Parker’s S0383-70 elastomer. Kinetic energy is calculated using the projectile 
velocity, not the velocity component perpendicular to the target. Strikes 2 and 7, boxed in bold, used wider Parker seals 
(5.2 mm), Strikes 21 and 22 were on large aluminum plates with a 0.5 mm thick coating of S0383-70, all other strikes 
were on 2.5 mm wide seals. See Table 1 for additional details on specific Strikes. The accuracy of leakage flow 
measurements was typically ± 5×10-6 kg air/day, thus leakage below this level is listed as 5×10-6 kg/day. Seal failure is 
defined as leakage > 0.001 kg air/day. Shaded data was used in Figure 8 and in the calculation of the Dseal(KE) power law 
function. Strikes 35c, d, and 37 were at -78 °C. 
Strike # Mass mg 
Velocity 
km/s 
Kinetic 
Energy 
Joules 
dv  
mm 
ds  
mm 
dc  
mm 
Ave. Crater 
dia., Dseal 
mm 
Distance 
from seal's 
center c-c 
mm 
Leakage kg 
air/day 
29 0.093 5.75 1.55 1.07 1.89 2.6 1.853 0.18 5.0E-06 
31 0.093 7.57 2.68 0.68 0.972 1.08 0.911 -1.06 5.0E-06 
9 0.084 8.19 2.83 1.275 2.196 2.84 2.104 0.041 0.02 
35c 0.093 7.8 2.84 1.17 1.544 1.717 1.477 0.94 5.0E-06  
17 0.093 7.93 2.94 1.14 2.44 2.8 2.127 0.38 5.0E-06 
35d 0.093 8.22 3.16 1.125 1.63 1.76 1.505 -0.69 5.0E-06 
15 0.183 8.04 5.90 1.52 3.26 3.38 2.720 -0.19 0.3 
37 0.183 8.29 6.27 1.86 3.27 3.36 2.830 -0.3 0.1 
6 0.316 8.22 10.66 1.105 1.31 1.91 1.442 1.02 5.4E-06 
6b 0.316 8.26 10.76 1.89 4.01 4.07 3.323 0.167 0.2 
2 0.501 8.17 16.72 2.37 4.69 6.43 4.497 -0.4 5.0E-06 
7d 0.748 8.27 25.58 3.06 4.52 7.75 5.110 n/a 5.0E-06 
7c 0.748 8.29 25.70 1.96 3.45 3.93 3.113 1.83 5.0E-06 
7f 0.805 8.24 27.34 2.46 5.27 6.2 4.643 n/a 5.0E-06 
21 0.093 8.24 3.17 2.4 2.75 2.98 2.710 n/a   
22 0.748 8.19 25.08 3.45 6 6.2 5.217 n/a   
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Table 4. Surface Diameters for Craters in Esterline’s ELA-SA-401 elastomer. Kinetic energy is calculated using the 
projectile velocity, not the velocity component perpendicular to the target. See Table 1 for additional details on specific 
Strikes. The accuracy of leakage flow measurements was typically ± 5×10-6 kg air/day, thus leakage below this level is 
listed as 5×10-6 kg/day. Seal failure is defined as leakage > 0.001 kg air/day. Strikes shaded gray were used in Dseal, KE 
power law analysis (Fig. 7); Strikes 36 and 38b were at -78 °C.  
Strike # Mass  mg 
Velocity 
km/s 
Kinetic Energy 
Joules 
dv 
mm 
ds  
mm 
dc  
mm 
Ave. Crater 
dia.,  
Dseal  
mm 
Distance from 
seal's center,  
c-c  
mm 
Leakage 
kg/day 
3 0.501 8.21 16.887 2.95 4.506 4.81 4.09 2.3 5.0E-06 
30 1.461 5.56 22.58 2.84 2.84 6.85 4.18 0.54 5.0E-06 
1 0.748 8.3 25.763 3.29 3.29 6.6 4.39 -1.01 5.0E-06 
18 1.031 7.84 31.699 3.45 6.09 7.81 5.78 2.06 5.0E-06 
32 1.461 7.47 40.758 3.61 3.914 6.78 4.77 2.14 5.0E-06 
36 1.461 7.56 41.746 3.2 3.2 4.89 3.76 3.37 5.0E-06 
10 1.319 8.38 46.33 3.18 4.78 10.07 6.01 0.7   
4c 1.461 8.19 48.994 4.53 4.53 10.38 6.48 0 5.0E-06 
16 2.096 7.61 60.698 4.23 8.49 10.12 7.61 0.187 0.3 
38b 3.209 7.95 101.42 5.3 7.5 8.6 7.13 1.95 5.0E-06 
8c 3.209 8.24 108.96 5.2 8.7 10.87 8.26 1.8 5.0E-06 
5b 7.177 8.1 235.45 5.63 11.03 14.62 10.43 -0.63 0.3 
 
Figure 7 shows the kinetic energy plotted with the resulting average crater diameter, Df, for hits into aluminum 
targets. Note that kinetic energy in Table 2, and in the plot is calculated using the velocity of the particle, not the 
velocity component perpendicular to the target. A power law fit of these data yields the following: 
 
 Df = 1.3(KE)0.3556 (1) 
 
where Df is the average surface diameter of the crater in aluminum in units of mm, and KE is kinetic energy of the 
projectile in units of joules. We use Eq. (1) to determine Df for each kinetic energy input into BUMPER. For each 
KE input, we can now find WF (where WF = Df – Dcrit) and the weighting ratio WF/W. It is understood that it is 
unlikely that a particular HVI test will yield the exact KEcrit, and that the true KEcrit will likely be between a pair of 
tests conditions. The Dcrit used to calculate WF can be calculated from Eq. (1) by inputting an estimated KEcrit or 
from experimental measurements of crater diameters from tests which employed impact energies near KEcrit. We 
estimated KEcrit for each case based on the values in the tables, then used Eq. (1), (2), and (3) to determine the Dcrit 
values used in the determination of WF.  
Consideration of crater size as a function of kinetic energy is more complicated when considering the elastomer 
seals compared to the semi-infinite flange materials. The level of damage done to the seal is dependent on where on 
the seal the projectile strikes. If the particle misses the seal, no damage is done; if the particle hits near an edge, 
close to the inner or outer side wall, the high pressure that develops on impact is relieved due to the hit’s close 
proximity to the side wall. An example of this is provided by Strikes 6 and 6b (Table 3). Strike 6 hit near the side 
wall, about 1 mm from the seal’s center-line, caused a crater 1.4 mm wide, and did not cause a failure. Strike 6b had 
the same kinetic energy but hit near the seal’s centerline (c-c = 0.167 mm), created a crater 3.3 mm wide, and caused 
a seal failure. Results to date show that target temperature influences damage. In our tests lower temperatures appear 
to slightly decrease damage in the elastomers. We have tests at elevated temperatures planned. Results from tests at 
low temperatures and hits near seal side walls were omitted when considering crater size as a function of projectile 
kinetic energy. Table 3 shows the tests included in Figure 8, shaded gray, and used to determine the power law 
function for the Parker elastomer:  
 
 Dseal =1.476KE0.366 (2) 
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The leakage data in Table 3 indicate that 
the minimum kinetic energy required to 
cause a seal failure is about 2.8 J for the 
2.5 mm wide Parker seal. This KEcrit value is 
used with Eq. (2) to determine Dcrit and WF. 
The KEcrit value for Esterline seal failure 
distilled from Table 4 is 60 J. 
The shaded gray data in Table 4 are 
presented in Figure 9 which shows the 
power law function found for the Esterline 
elastomer: 
 
 Dseal = 1.336KE0.3878 (3) 
 
 The filled triangles in Figure 9 are 
results from impacts using Nylon66 
projectiles and show the limits of using 
kinetic energy in relation to crater diameter. 
Kinetic energy might relate well to aspects 
of hypervelocity impact damage, such as 
depth of penetration, however, we are 
interested in how the damage interacts with 
the LIDS seal, thus need to solve for damage 
aspects near the surface of the target because 
it is these surface aspects, like surface crater diameter, which cause seal failure. Particles of relatively low density 
yield larger than expected crater diameters when considering kinetic energy only because the volume of the low 
desity particle is relatively large, thus it has a larger footprint when landing on the target, thereby causing a larger 
crater at the surface. 
If we consider Eq(1), and substitue KE = mV 2/2 = πd3V2ρ/12, we get: 
 
 Df = 1.3(πd3V2ρ/12)0.3556 = 0.807(d1.067V0.71ρ0.3556) (4) 
 
These powers of d, V, and ρ are frequently 
seen in the literature and are a direct result of 
the assumption that kinetic energy controls 
the level of damage to the target. The units of 
Df, d, V, and ρ in Eq.(4) are mm, m, m/s, and 
kg/m3 respectively. Kinetic energy is an 
excellent starting point when building 
relations between projectiles and resulting 
damage, however, we believe improvements 
can be made in assessing the surface 
diameter of craters by emperically tuning the 
exponents of d, V, and ρ. We are currently 
engaged in aquiring additional data to fine 
tune these exponents. The results presented 
in this paper use Eq. (1), (2), and (3) to 
estimate the crater’s average suface diameter 
at given kinetic energies.  
We can also estimate crater diameter 
using Cour-Palais depth of penetration 
relations and the approximation that the 
crater diameter is double the crater’s depth:29 
 
Df|C-P = 2×5.24H–0.25d19/18(ρp/ρt)0.5(Vn/C)2/3 
Figure 7. Average Crater Surface Diameter in Aluminum 
from Projectiles of Different Kinetic Energy. Velocity ranged 
from 7.5 to 8.34 km/s; target and projectile materials were 
6061 T651 and 2017 T4 aluminum respectively; projectile 
diameters ranged from 0.4 to 1.6 mm. These data yield Df = 
1.3KE0.3556.   
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R² = 0.9911
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
0 100 200 300 400
A
ve
. C
ra
te
r d
ia
. D
f, 
m
m
Kinetic Energy, J
Figure 8. Average Crater Surface Diameter in Parker 
0S383-70 from Projectiles of Different Kinetic Energy. Hits 
more than 25% of the seal width away from the center-line, 
and hits at low temperatures omitted. Data included is 
shown in gray in Table 3. These data yield Dseal = 
1.476KE0.366.  
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where Df|C-P is in cm, H is the Brinell hardness of 
the target, Vn is projectile velocity normal to the 
target, C is the speed of sound in the target, and 
projectile diameter d is in units of cm. A direct 
comparison of Eq.(4) and the Cour-Palais depth 
of penetration relation is illustrated graphically in 
Figure 10 for a 6061 T6 aluminum target, and 0.1 
cm 2017 T4 aluminum projectile.  In the velocity 
range of 7 to 10 km/s, the difference between the 
current work and Cour-Palais’ relation is about 
29%. This difference is due in part to differences 
in how the crater diameters are defined.30 About 
half of the difference between the C-P relation 
and Eq.(4) is due to differences in how the crater 
diameters are defined. Equation (4) yields the 
average between the crater’s dfi and dfo, while the 
C-P relation yields a diameter more characteristic 
of the crater’s inner diameter.29,30 
F. BUMPER MMOD Risk Assessments 
BUMPER is a risk assessment tool used by 
NASA.22 There are many things that BUMPER 
can be used for and many options and directions 
one can explore within BUMPER. We use a very 
specific set of options within BUMPER to 
determine the cumulative flux of particles of 
various kinetic energies. This is one step in the 
solution of MMOD risks to the LIDS seal.  
6. Definition of Failure and Failure Modes 
The LIDS seal is a set of two seals, an inner seal 
and an outer seal. These seals mate to corresponding 
metal flange areas on either ISS, or the lunar capsule 
known as Altair, for example. Thus there are four 
sealing surfaces whenever the LIDS seal system is 
mated, two elastomer seals mating to two metal flange 
areas. Damage to any one of these four surfaces is a 
potential threat to the LIDS system. For this seal 
design, failure occurs when one or more of the 
following set of failures occurs: 
 
a) The inner and outer seals fail, the probability of 
which is defined as P(Sio); 
b) The inner seal and outer flange areas fail to 
seal, the probability of which is defined as P(SiFo); 
c) The outer seal and inner flange area fail to seal, 
the probability of which is defined as P(SoFi); 
d) The inner and outer flange areas fail to seal, the 
probability of which is defined as P(Fio). 
 
Each one of these failures is a combination of two failures. A failure in both an inner seal or flange AND an 
outer seal or flange must occur for the system to fail. Thus the probability associated with each of the failure modes 
noted above is an intersection of two failures (both must occur). The probability of the LIDS seal system to fail is 
then the union of these intersecting failure modes. The seal and flange areas have different flight histories which are 
incorporated into BUMPER. Once the probability of failure for the seals and flange areas are found, the appropriate 
intersections and then unions are determined, thus yielding the probability of seal failure for a particular mission.  
Figure 10.  Comparison of the Cour-Palais and de 
Groh’s Eq. (4).  Comparison employs 6061 T6 
target, and 2017 T4 0.1 cm diameter aluminum 
projectile.   
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7.  BUMPER results and data processing 
 Table 5 presents an example of BUMPER inputs and outputs and some of the data processing that was done to 
estimate MMOD risks to the LIDS seal. The example is for the case of Parker seal flange areas on ISS after a period 
of 2 years with Node 2 facing forward, into the orbital velocity vector of ISS (ram facing LEO exposure). This case 
by its self provides a good estimate of MMOD risk for a mission to ISS after the flange has been in place on ISS for 
4 years, since docking nodes on ISS are covered about half of the time and because contributions to risk from this 
area are much greater than all others combined. Risks from this area are relatively large because the MMOD flux is 
high for the forward facing ram orientation. Figure 11 shows how the probability of a seal failure accumulates for 
the inner and outer flange areas. Contributions to risk are small at high kinetic energies because the population of  
 
 Table 5. BUMPER Results and Data Processing Example. BUMPER results and partial data processing for Parker 
flange areas exposed to LEO for 2 years. Kinetic energy, KE, is input into BUMPER which determines the cumulative 
Probability of Impact (PoI), SumPoI, for the inner and outer flange areas; the PoI for a Single KE is found by 
subtracting off the PoI for the next larger KE (Single PoIi = SumPoIi – SumPoIi+1); Single KEi = (KEi + KEi+1)/2; WF = 
Df – Dcrit = 1.3KE0.3556 – 1.3KEcrit0.3556, where KEcrit is found by experiments to be 2.9 J in this case; W is the seal area 
width; the probability of a seal failure at a particular projectile energy is Single PoI x WF/W; the cumulative 
probability of seal failure at a particular kinetic energy or greater is found by summing the Single PoF values 
(SumPoFi = SumPoFi-1 + Single PoFi). Single KE and SumPoF are plotted in Figure 11. 
KE Sum PoI 
Sum 
PoI 
Single 
KE 
Single 
PoI 
Single 
PoI  WF 
Width 
Ratio 
Single 
PoF 
Single 
PoF 
Sum 
PoF 
Sum 
PoF 
J Inner Outer J Inner Outer mm WF/W Inner Outer Inner Outer 
2 9.6E-02 9.8E-02 2.44 2.9E-02 2.9E-02 0 0 0 0 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 
2.88 6.7E-02 6.9E-02 2.94 2.7E-03 2.7E-03 0 0 0 0 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 
3 6.5E-02 6.6E-02 3.25 9.3E-03 9.5E-03 0.023 0.001 1.1E-05 1.2E-05 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 
3.5 5.5E-02 5.7E-02 3.75 7.1E-03 7.2E-03 0.132 0.007 4.9E-05 5.0E-05 2.8E-03 2.8E-03 
4 4.8E-02 5.0E-02 4.3 6.5E-03 6.7E-03 0.232 0.012 7.9E-05 8.1E-05 2.7E-03 2.8E-03 
4.6 4.2E-02 4.3E-02 4.9 5.0E-03 5.2E-03 0.341 0.018 9.0E-05 9.3E-05 2.6E-03 2.7E-03 
5.2 3.7E-02 3.8E-02 5.6 5.2E-03 5.3E-03 0.442 0.023 1.2E-04 1.2E-04 2.5E-03 2.6E-03 
6 3.2E-02 3.3E-02 7 8.5E-03 8.7E-03 0.565 0.030 2.5E-04 2.6E-04 2.4E-03 2.5E-03 
8.0 2.3E-02 2.4E-02 9 5.1E-03 5.2E-03 0.832 0.044 2.2E-04 2.3E-04 2.2E-03 2.2E-03 
10 1.8E-02 1.9E-02 12.5 6.7E-03 6.9E-03 1.059 0.056 3.7E-04 3.8E-04 1.9E-03 2.0E-03 
15.0 1.1E-02 1.2E-02 17.5 3.3E-03 3.4E-03 1.520 0.080 2.6E-04 2.7E-04 1.6E-03 1.6E-03 
20 8.2E-03 8.4E-03 25 3.2E-03 3.2E-03 1.890 0.099 3.1E-04 3.2E-04 1.3E-03 1.4E-03 
30.0 5.1E-03 5.2E-03 35 1.5E-03 1.5E-03 2.479 0.130 1.9E-04 2.0E-04 1.0E-03 1.0E-03 
40.0 3.6E-03 3.7E-03 70 2.4E-03 2.5E-03 2.952 0.155 3.7E-04 3.8E-04 8.1E-04 8.3E-04 
100 1.2E-03 1.2E-03 125 4.2E-04 4.4E-04 4.824 0.253 1.1E-04 1.1E-04 4.4E-04 4.5E-04 
150 7.3E-04 7.5E-04 171 1.7E-04 1.8E-04 5.868 0.308 5.3E-05 5.4E-05 3.3E-04 3.4E-04 
192 5.6E-04 5.8E-04 196 2.5E-05 2.5E-05 6.581 0.345 8.5E-06 8.7E-06 2.8E-04 2.8E-04 
200 5.4E-04 5.5E-04 215 7.7E-05 7.9E-05 6.705 0.352 2.7E-05 2.8E-05 2.7E-04 2.7E-04 
230 4.6E-04 4.7E-04 245 5.9E-05 6.1E-05 7.143 0.375 2.2E-05 2.3E-05 2.4E-04 2.5E-04 
260 4.0E-04 4.1E-04 280 6.0E-05 6.2E-05 7.546 0.396 2.4E-05 2.5E-05 2.2E-04 2.2E-04 
300 3.4E-04 3.5E-04 350 9.7E-05 1.0E-04 8.040 0.422 4.1E-05 4.2E-05 1.9E-04 2.0E-04 
400 2.4E-04 2.5E-04 450 5.7E-05 5.8E-05 9.110 0.478 2.7E-05 2.8E-05 1.5E-04 1.6E-04 
500 1.9E-04 1.9E-04 575 5.1E-05 5.2E-05 10.02 0.526 2.7E-05 2.7E-05 1.3E-04 1.3E-04 
650 1.4E-04 1.4E-04 725 3.1E-05 3.1E-05 11.18 0.587 1.8E-05 1.8E-05 1.0E-04 1.0E-04 
800 1.1E-04 1.1E-04 900 2.6E-05 2.6E-05 12.19 0.640 1.6E-05 1.7E-05 8.2E-05 8.4E-05 
1000 8.0E-05 8.2E-05 1200 2.8E-05 2.8E-05 13.35 0.701 1.9E-05 2.0E-05 6.5E-05 6.7E-05 
1400 5.2E-05 5.4E-05 1700 1.9E-05 2.0E-05 15.29 0.802 1.5E-05 1.6E-05 4.6E-05 4.7E-05 
2000 3.3E-05 3.4E-05   3.3E-05 3.4E-05 17.61 0.924 3.1E-05 3.2E-05 3.1E-05 3.2E-05 
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these larger, faster particles is less. 
Contributions to the probability of a seal 
failure decline and go to zero at the lower 
kinetic energies because the ratio WF/W is 
becoming small, and particles below 2.9 J do 
not cause seal failure in this case. The major 
result of this example is the maximum 
SumPoF values, found at the top of the 
SumPoF columns in Table 5, and in the upper 
left of Figure 11. By multiplying these two 
SumPoF values we determine the intersection 
of the probabilities of a MMOD failure for 
the inner and outer flange areas (failure mode 
“d” noted above).  
 The contributions to risk from the 
different failure modes and their union is 
presented in Figure 12 for the 2 year Parker 
case; shown are the probabilities of seal 
failure caused by MMOD damage to: both 
seals, P(Sio); the inner seal and outer flange 
area, P(SiFo); the outer seal and inner flange 
area, P(SoFi); both flange areas, P(Fio); and 
their union, the total probability of failure for 
this case, PoF = P(Sio) + P(SiFo) + P(SoFi) + 
P(Fio). 
Figure 13 presents MMOD risk estimates, 
PoF, for the LIDS seal and flange system for 
the two elastomers for various mission times 
and flight altitudes. Details relevant to these 
cases are: 
- 0.01 years: Represents threats to CEV 
during the approximately 4 day period 
between launch and docking with ISS or 
Altair. 
- 0.02 years: Reflects risk to Altair during 
the approximately 8 day period after launch, 
and before docking with CEV. This includes 
risks to CEV. 
- 0.58 years: MMOD risks during a 217 day 
Lunar mission assuming the seal and Altair 
flange are exposed the whole time. Includes 
the 4 and 8 day LEO periods for CEV and 
Altair respectively.  
- 1 year: Probability of failure upon 
docking to ISS after 1 year of ram exposure at 
Node 2. Includes 4 days of CEV seal 
exposure, and is representative of the level of 
risk expected for an ISS flange in service for 
2 years since docking nodes are exposed only 
half of the time.  
- 2 year: PoF for a mission to ISS resulting from 2 years of ram exposure at Node 2; representative of risks due to 
4 years of flange service at Node 2; includes 4 days of CEV LEO exposure. 
- 5 years: PoF for a mission to ISS after Node 2 has received 5 years of ram exposure. Includes 4 days of CEV 
seal exposure. It is expected to take 10 years to accumulate this level of MMOD exposure. 
Figure 11. Cumulative Probability of Parker Flange Area 
Failure. Data presented in Table 5; 2 years LEO ram facing 
exposure. The contribution to risk from the flange areas 
failing would be the intersection of both the inner and outer 
areas failing, P(Fio) = 3.26E-3×3.34E-3 = 1.09E-5, shown in 
Figure 12. This risk intersection is then summed with 
contributions from other failure modes.  
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Figure 13. Probability of Failure due to MMOD for Parker and Esterline LIDS seal designs. Mission times 
reflect threats to CEV prior to docking, CEV docking with Altair, full exposure during a Lunar mission, and 
missions to ISS after 1, 2, 5, and 10 years of ram exposure at Node 2.  
 
- 10 years: PoF for a mission to ISS after 10 years of ram exposure at Node 2; includes risk to CEV’s LIDS seals. 
It is expected to take 20 years to accumulate this level of MMOD exposure 
Figure 13 shows that threats to the Esterline seal are much lower compared to the narrower Parker seal. Note that 
the scale in Figure 13 is logarithmic; the probability of failure of the Esterline seal is between 2 and 3 orders of 
magnitude less than the Parker seal. This is because the Esterline seal is wider, thus requires a more energetic 
particle (bigger and or faster) to causes its failure. Such larger particles are less frequent is space.  
 
8. Comparison of Allowed Risk to Expected Risk 
In the 1990’s the International Space Station Project developed the formula: 
 
 PNP = PNF = XA*t (5) 
 
to allocate MMOD risks to vehicles and modules docked to ISS. PNP is Probability of No Penetration, X is a 
constant, A is the area exposed to the MMOD environment for the item being considered in square meters, and t is 
time of the exposure in years. Since failure occurs at penetration, PNP is analogous to PNF, Probability of No 
Failure. NASA determines an acceptable level of risk (PNF) for a particular vehicle area (A), time period (t), and 
failure mode (such as Loss of Crew, or Loss of Mission). With PNF, A, and t defined, the constant X is determined 
for the case being considered. With this scenario specific X, the allowable risks associated with smaller portions of 
the vehicle and mission can be determined. This assumes the risk is spread evenly over the whole area, A. The 
MMOD risks to each of these smaller areas of the vehicle is considered and compared to its allotted portion found 
using Eq. (5). In this way, sections of the vehicle or mission that present the highest risk can be found.  
Sometimes, certain sections of a vehicle are given a specific MMOD risk sub-allotment. For such cases, 
acceptable levels of risk are defined and X values determined which are unique to a specific section of the larger 
vehicle. The LIDS system has been given such a sub-allotment, and allowable MMOD risk levels defined for Loss 
of Mission objective (LOMo) failures during ISS, Lunar Sortie and Lunar Outpost missions. Table 6 shows the 
programmatically set allowable risk of LOMo due to MMOD damage to LIDS, a preliminary estimate of LIDS 
surface area over which this level of risk is shared, and the time considered for each mission. With PNF, A, and t 
defined, X for the LIDS system is found and used to determine allowable levels of risk (PNF) to the LIDS seal for 
each mission, assuming uniform proportioning of MMOD risk over all of LIDS’s areas. The LIDS area listed in 
Table 6 (7.23 m2) was found by FEM modeling of external as well as internal LIDS elements. The applicability of 
this area to our case is still being considered. Internal surface areas within LIDS are exposed to a lesser extent than 
the outside of LIDS, thus we consider this area to be a very conservative (high) estimate. Area estimates of LIDS 
based on its overall structure, including both internal and external surfaces composing the “pressure vessel” yields 
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an area of 4.3 m2. Using a lesser area such as 4.3 m2 would result in lower X values, and a lower PNF requirements 
for the LIDS seal. Comparing MMOD risk estimates from BUMPER to allowed levels shows whether the seal is 
expected to consume more, or less, than its fair share of available risk. At this time standard CEV mission times are 
defined as 210 days for ISS and Lunar Outpost missions, and 31 days for Lunar Sortie. It is recognized the X values 
presented in Table 6 are conservative for the following reasons: 1) refinements are being examined that are expected 
to reduce the 7.23 m2 area currently used, and 2) because LIDS is docked for most of the 0.575 year duration of ISS 
missions only the outer area is exposed to MMOD threats. 
 
 
 Table 6. LIDS system X values for missions, and LIDS Seal Risk Allotment. Shown are the missions considered; 
allowable levels of risk due to MMOD threats to LIDS programmatically defined; PNP = 1-(1/risk), total area of 
LIDS (this area is our current best estimate of the LIDS surface area exposed to MMOD threats); time span of 
exposure; and resulting X values for the LIDS system. Eq.(4) is used with the mission time, X, and LIDS seal area 
to determine allotted risk to the LIDS seal for a Loss of Mission failure. 
Mission  Allowable Risk of LOMo 
LIDS 
PNP 
LIDS Area, 
m2 
Time, 
|years X 
LIDS seal 
area,  
m2 
LIDS seal  
PNF 
ISS 1 in 2000 0.9995 7.23 0.5749487 0.99987969 0.172 0.999988102 
Lunar 
Sortie 1 in 33,333 0.99997 7.23 0.0848734 0.99995111 0.172 0.999999286 
Lunar 
Outpost 1 in 33,333 0.99997 7.23 0.5749487 0.99999278 0.172 0.999999286 
 
 
Figure 14 compares the allotted risk provided to the LIDS seal for a mission to ISS (from Table 6) to the 
estimates of risk due to MMOD threats to the 2.5 mm wide Parker seal found using BUMPER simulations. For any 
mission to ISS, the allotment is the same; however, missions to ISS are expected for the next 10 years. When 
determining the actual risk, the total time sensitive sealing surfaces are exposed to MMOD threats needs to be 
accounted for. For example, after the flange side of LIDS is placed onto one of ISS’s docking nodes for the first 
time, it will likely sit there and wait for the next spacecraft. The next spacecraft is expected in about six months and 
when it docks to ISS it will mate with a LIDS flange that has been exposed to space for about half a year. Over the 
next five years spacecrafts are expected to alternate their dockings between  Node 1 and 2, thus after five years, ram 
exposure at Node 2 is expected to be about 2.5 years (since it has been covered due to previous dockings for half of 
the five years). As time in orbit accumulates, a strike by a damaging projectile becomes more likely, thus the 
probability of no failure decreases, while our allowed risk remains the same, as shown in Figure 14.  
To satisfy the risk requirement, the expected risks to the seal have to be less than the allocation; put another way, 
the expected probability of no failure for the seal has to be greater than the PNF allotment. As can be seen in Figure 
14, the Parker 2.5 mm wide seal design satisfies risk requirements for service periods of two years or less. Expected 
risks to the Parker seal are approximately equal to the allotment after five years, and after ten years, the PNF for the 
Parker seal drops below the risk allotment, thus the 2.5 mm wide Parker seal fails to meet safety requirements after 
five years of total time in service. Probability of no failure estimates for the Esterline seal were above the PNF 
allocation for all service periods. 
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Figure 14. ISS mission MMOD risk allocation compared to expected risk to 2.5 mm wide Parker 
seal. Risk allocation from Table 6 for a 210 day mission to ISS; risk of seal failure due to 
MMOD damage shown for total time the ISS side of LIDS has been in service. It is assumed that 
over this total time in service each docking node has been covered half the time.  
 
Another way to assess MMOD risks to the LIDS seal 
is to acknowledge the dominance of the ISS side of LIDS, 
sometimes referred to as the passive side of LIDS, which 
is on the docking/connecting tube known as ATLAS 
(APAS To Low impact docking system Adaptor System, 
where APAS is the Androgynous Peripheral Attachment 
System). As shown in Figure 12, MMOD risks to the 
LIDS system are dominated by risks to the ISS flange, 
P(Fio), since the exposure time for the flange is much 
greater than the exposure time for the elastomer seals on 
CEV. The ISS side of LIDS is attached to ISS, so perhaps 
we should consider LOMo allotments associated with ISS 
rather than CEV. There is no official LOMo allotment for 
ISS, however allocation of MMOD threats to ISS for the 
more restrictive Loss of Crew (LOC) condition has been 
previously defined as:  
 
 PNP = 0.99999At (6) 
 
Applying the times of one through ten years, and the 
LIDS seal area we can solve for a series of LIDS flange 
MMOD risk allocations; these are shown in Figure 15 
with the results for expected MMOD risks to the 2.5 mm 
wide Parker seal (also shown in Fig. 14). The current 
Parker seal design does not meet expected ISS LOC safety 
requirements after 2 years; LOMo risk allotments are 
expected to be less stringent.  
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9. MMOD risk mitigation 
The initial 2.5 mm wide design of the Parker seal was the result of many engineering considerations, one being 
the clamping load required to adequately compress the seal during docking. Since the 2.5 mm wide seal does not 
meet desired MMOD safety requirements for in-service times greater than about 3 years, a second look at its width 
is warranted since increasing the width will lower expected MMOD risk (raise its PNF).  Other options to lower 
risks from MMOD are to add a third seal, or to add features to the seal so that a leak would not be able to run around 
the entire circumferential space between the inner and outer seal. From a flight testing and qualification standpoint, 
the simpler solution is to widen the seal bulb, thus this option will be considered here.  
Based on the data in Table 2 and Eq. (1) (KEcrit = 2.9 J) the critical crater diameter for the flange area with the 
2.5 mm wide Parker seal was Dcrit|f = 2.0 mm, which is 80% of the width of the seal’s elastomer bulb, wbulb. If we 
assume a wider seal will fail at a similar crater-to-seal bulb width ratio, WF can be defined as WF|f = Df – (80% 
wbulb). Table 3 and Eq. (2) indicate the 2.5 mm wide seal fails at a Dcrit|s = 2.1 mm, which is 84% of the seal bulb 
width. We assume a wider Parker seal will fail at a similar crater-to-seal width ratio, thus WF|s = Dseal – (84% wbulb). 
Using these assumptions MMOD threats for a variety of seal widths were found and are presented in Table 7 for the 
case of 10 years in service (5 years ram exposure at Node 2). A Parker seal 3.6 mm wide would approximately meet 
LOMo MMOD risk requirements for the LIDS seal. For margin considerations, making the seal 3.8 mm wide would 
exceed the risk allotment of 1 in 84,050 by approximately 25%; making the seal 4.0 mm wide would exceed the 
allotment by about 50%. We are presently working on how such wider seals will affect docking loads and how those 
loads might be mitigated.  
 
 
IV. Conclusions 
This work presents an initial analysis procedure to predict meteoroid and orbital debris threats to candidate 
docking seals being considered for LIDS. Presented are the results of the hypervelocity impact testing performed to 
define the failure criteria of the seal/flange combination in the Low Impact Docking System to be used for the Crew 
Exploration Vehicle docking to the International Space Station and other potential space vehicles planned for lunar 
missions.  Also presented in this paper are the results of the BUMPER code assessment of the probability of failure 
of the seal/flange system from MMOD impacts.  It was shown that the Parker 2.5 mm wide seal design satisfies risk 
requirements for service periods of two years or less. However, after five years, the Probability of No Failure for the 
Parker seal drops below the risk allotment, thus the 2.5 mm wide Parker seal fails to meet safety requirements after 
five years of total time in service. Probability of No Failure estimates for the wider-pad (9.1 mm) Esterline seal were 
above the PNF allocation for all service periods.  Preliminary calculations show that with some design modification, 
a Parker seal 3.6 mm wide would approximately meet the Loss Of Mission objective (LOMo) MMOD risk 
requirements for the LIDS seal.  For safety margin considerations, making the seal bulb 3.8 or 4.0 mm wide would 
exceed the LOMo MMOD LIDS risk allotment of 1 in 84,050 by approximately 25 and 50% respectively.   
Further refinements being considered for the current methodology include refinements to the areas exposed to 
MMOD threats under different docked/undocked conditions, flight times, and orientation scenarios affecting the risk 
allocation calculations. Future activities also include risk mitigation efforts using modified designs and examining 
the effects of the temperature extreme of 125 °C. Similar risk assessments using BUMPER are planned so that the 
estimated risk of failure due to MMOD threats to these modified seal designs can be compared to allowable risk 
levels.  
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